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I.

INTRODUCTION

This case involves an appeal of a jury verdict in favor of the respondent
who was viciously attacked by a dog whom prior to the attack had been
cited as dangerous/ dangerous dog by animal control. Appellants
appealed the jury verdict against them on the theory that they were not
custodians of the dog at the time of the attack and that their son as owner
of the dog and as such was solely responsible for the attack. The jury held
that the Appellants who had knowledge of the dangerous propensities of a
dog, assumed the role of caretakers of the dog and failed to take steps to
protect the public from the dangerous propensities of that dog were
responsible for the damages as a result of the dog attacking innocent third
parties.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
A jury verdict was entered against the Appellants, Mark and Robyn
Munkhoff collectively the Munkhoffs, along with their adult son, Sam, for
negligence in regards to an attack on Mr. Kummerling by a dog named "Bo".
The appellants are not appealing the jury's verdict in favor of assessing that
damage, but instead are appealing the denial of a Motion for Summary
Judgment as to a negligence claim by the Kummerlings. Reference to the
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"Kummerlings" hereinafter shall include both Plaintiffs, Klaus Kummerling
and Baerbel Litke husband and wife. The Munkhoffs are also appealing the
Order denying the Munkhoffs a new trial and request for remittitur under
I.R.C.P. 59.1 and I.R.C.P. 60. Appellants' argue that this matter should not
have gone to trial and the summary judgment should be granted on the
basis that no genuine issue of material fact existed. As can be seen from the
trial court's transcript and Affidavit of Officer Laurie Deus, there were
substantial issues of material fact, which were disputed. In the end the jury
believed the credibility of the Kummerlings and their version of events in
regards to disputed facts.
B. Statement of Facts
Both the Respondents, Kummerlings and the Appellant Munkhoffs
reside beside each other on Sutter's Way Street in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. (R
64

,r 4). In November, 2012 the Munkhoffs adult son, Sam Munkhoff (Sam)

claimed ownership of a Pitbull named Bo. Sam adopted the Pitbull to avoid it
being taken to the Kootenai County Animal Control. (TR Vol. II Page 230 11
2-11). Sam lied to Animal Control and said the dog was his even though it
was not. Bo, in November 2012, was found in an alley standing on top of a
vehicle barking profusely. (R 79
aggressive. (R 79

,r

,r

1). The dog was threatening and

1). Concerned about the danger to the public posed by
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the dog; the dog was tasered. (R 79
aggressive dog. (R 69

,r

,r 5). Sam was cited for having an

C).

Sam was provided a copy of the city ordinances with the requirements
for maintaining an aggressive dog including fencing, muzzling and signage
requirements on November 27, 2012. (R 79

,r

D). Officer Laurie Deus

explained these requirements both to Sam and Mark Munkhoff at the
Munkhoff's residence on Sutter's Way. (R 79-80

,r

D & E). Mark Munkhoff

further affirmed that the dog would be contained there and was part of the
family. (R 80

,r E). The information provided to Sam and Mark Munkhoff

indicated that if Bo was to stay anywhere else that animal control must be
notified. Evidence and testimony at trial indicated that Bo continued to
reside at the Munkhoff's through July 30, 2013 when Bo viciously attacked
Mr. Kummerling in the driveway of his home. (R 73

,r

6) (R 114

,r

12).

On the other hand the actual residences for Sam between November
2012 and July 30, 2013 are disputed. Mr. Kummerling stated that Sam

resided at the Munkhoff's for months before the attack. (R 112

,r 4). Sam

indicated he was living in Long Beach California (Tr Vol. II Page 237 11. 22-25
and page 238 11. 1-9) and Spokane, Washington (R 73

,r

B) to Officer Deus (R

98). He later admitted at trial that he lied to Officer Deus about living in

California. (Tr Vol. II Page 230 11. 2-3). In regards to Sam's assertion that he
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was living in the Spokane Valley in April 2013; Bo was cited for being a
dangerous dog for biting a person in Coeur d'Alene at the same time. (R 98).
Officer Deus drove by the Munkhoff home in December, 2012 and did not
see any beware of dog signs posted on the property (R 91

,r 3).

On February 9, 2013, Bo was found running loose in the City of Coeur d'
Alene by animal control officers. (R 98). He was picked up by animal control,
returned to Sam and not cited. (Tr Vol. II Page 234 11.1 16 through page 256
Line 25).
On April 29, 2013, Bo was running loose in the vicinity of Munkhoffs
home. (Tr Vol. II Page 235). Bo bit a person in that incident (Tr Vol. II Page
234 11. 16 through Page 256 Line 25). Sam was cited for having a dangerous
dog as a result of that incident. (Tr Vol. II Page 236 11. 1-4). The Munkhoffs
dog, Dexter, was also running loose with Bo and cited by animal control. (Tr
Vol. II Page 23611. 5-13). Though numerous attempts were made by animal
control to serve Sam with the declaration of dangerous dog to sign; they were
unsuccessful. (R 73

,r

4(b)(c)). Mark Munkhoff told Officer Deus on two

separate occasions in April and May of 2013 that Bo was not allowed on his
property (R 93) and (R 94

,r 4).

In the months prior and up to the attack on Mr. Kummerling on July
30, 2013, Sam was working in North Dakota (R 99
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,r

5) and (R 113

,r

7). All

during this time the Munkhoffs were the sole caretakers of Bo and he stayed
in their backyard (R 113

1 7).

Despite the requirement of signage informing the public of a
dangerous dog as required by Coeur d'Alene City none was ever placed on
the Munkhoffs premises (R 99
108

1 5).

1 5). Bo was never seen wearing a muzzle (R

Robyn Munkhoff indicated Sam bought a muzzle for Bo but wasn't

aware he was required to us it. (R99).
The Kummerlings never saw any signage on the Munkhoffs property
indicating the Munkhoffs had a dangerous dog (R 108 1 4) and (R 114 1 14).
On July 30, 2013, Klaus Kummerling was sitting in his driveway when Sam,
with Bo on a leash, approached on the sidewalk in front of the Kummerling
home (Tr Vol. I Page 75). Mr. Kummerling asked Sam if it was okay to pet Bo
(Tr Vol. I Page 75 11 13-24). As Mr. Kummerling bent down to reach out and
pet Bo; Bo lunged at Mr. Kummerling biting him in the face and knocking
him down in his driveway (Tr Vol. I Page 76). Mr. Kummerling suffered
permanent and disfiguring injuries to his face. A portion of his lip was ripped
off (Tr Vol. I Page 76 11 13-14). He suffered permanent nerve damage to the
lip and chin area (Tr Vol. I Page 105 11 9-14). Immediately after the attack
Sam left the area and took Bo with him (Tr Vol. II Page 241119-12). Robyn
Munkhoff arrived at the scene and demanded that Bo be shot (Tr Vol. I Page
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141 11 2-5). Mr. Kummer ling informed Officer Deus that if the Munkhoffs had

posted dangerous dogs signs, he would not have attempted to pet Bo (R 99).
C. Procedural History
Klaus Kummerling and his wife, Barbara Baerbel Litke filed a
Complaint in District Court, 1st Judicial District alleging claims for
negligence, gross negligence, outrage, and nuisance against the City of Coeur
d'Alene, Coeur d'Alene police chief, Ron Clark, Mark Munkhoff, Robyn
Munkhoff and Sam Munkhoff (R 10-18). As a result of a Summary Judgment
Motion filed by the City of Coeur d'Alene, the trial court dismissed the City of
Coeur d'Alene and the Coeur d'Alene police chief, Ron Clark as defendants
(R 210-228). The Munkhoffs also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
requesting dismissal of all the Kummerlings' claims (R 44-45). The trial court
dismissed all claims except the negligence claims against the Munkhoffs (R
189-209). Sam, who represented himself, did not join in the Summary

Judgment Motion of the Munkhoffs.
Trial was held on the matter before Judge Cynthia K. C. Meyer from
September 19 through September 22, 2016. The jury, after deliberating,
returned a verdict in the sum of $185,000.00 for non-economic damages and
$16,603.00 in economic damages finding Sam Munkhoff 45% responsible,
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Mark Munkhoff 40% responsible, Robyn Munkhoff 10% responsible and
Klaus Kummerling 5% responsible.
Subsequent to the jury verdict, the Munkoffs filed a Motion for
remittitur and new trial on October 11, 2016 (R 410-418). After hearing on
the matter, the trial court denied said motions pursuant to a memorandum
decision (R 436-456). The Appellants filed this appeal on December 14,
2016, (R 462-465) which was amended on January 31, 2017 (R 466-469)
and subsequently again amended on February 28, 2017 (R 470-476).
1. Munkhoff's Motion for Summary Judgment
The Munkhoffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in this matter
on March 17, 2016 (R 44-45). The Munkhoffs, in their Motion, moved for an
Order Granting Summary Judgment on Kummerling's claim of negligence,
nuisance and outrage as stated in the Kummerling's third ca~se of action in
the Complaint. Sam Munkhoff, who wa Pro Se, did not file a motion for
summary judgment nor did he join in the Munkhoff's Motion. On May 17,
2016, the trial court filed a Memorandum Decision in regards to the
Munkhoff's Motion for Summary Judgment (R 168-188). An Amended
Memorandum Decision was filed by the trial court with the corrections to
specifically page 14 on May 18, 2016 (R 189-209). In that decision the trial
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court dismissed Kummerling's claims of outrage and nuisance but denied
the Munkhoff's Motion to dismiss the Kummerling's claims of negligence.
2. Trial
The case was tried to a jury on September 19, 2016 through
September 22, 2016. The sole issue was whether the Defendants were
negligent in allowing the dog, Bo to attack Mr. Kummerling and that
negligence was a proximate cause of the Kummerling's damages. Sam
Munkhoff appeared Pro Se. The jury ultimately found in favor of
Kummerling in which he was awarded $16,603.00 in economic damages
and $185,000.00 in non-economic damages. The fault by jury verdict was
allocated as follows: Sam Munkhoff 45%, Mark Munkhoff 45%, Robin
Munkoff 10% and Klaus Kummerling 5%.
3. Motion for Remittitur and New Trial
Munkhoffs filed a Motion for Remittitur for a New Trial on October 11,
2016 (R 410-418). In the Motion for New Trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l),
the Munkhoffs alleged three basis'. The first was an irregularity in the
proceedings by an adverse party. The Munkhoffs alleged that Klaus
Kummerling, who was hard of hearing, "faked" his hearing loss when he
requested an assisted hearing device from the court (R 407-408) and (R 412).
The Munkhoffs alleged that Mr. Kummerling was not hard of hearing when
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asking to pet the dog, Bo on July 30, 2016, but somehow at the time of trial,
a little over a year later, indicated he had trouble hearing (R 410-418). In
actuality Mr. Kummerling had suffered a medical condition between July 30,
2016 and the trial date, which caused a severe and permanent hearing loss
(R 419-420) and (R 423-425). These facts were unrebutted by Munkhoffs.
The Munkhoffs also requested a new trial based upon excessive
damages citing I. C. § 6-807(1)(2) (R 412-414). The trial court found that in
relationship to the horrific damages suffered by Mr. Kummerling that the
damages were not excessive and were reasonable (R 436-456). The jury
found that the actions or inactions of the Munkhoffs constituted negligence
and in part ere a proximate cause of the injuries to Mr. Kummerling. The
court denied the Munkhoffs motion finding no excessive verdict and no
basis for remittitur or a new trial (R 436-456). On November 7, 2016, the
Judgment on Special Verdict against Mark Munkhoff in the amount of
$77,243.30, Robin Munkhoff in the amount of $19,310.82 and Sam
Munkhoff in the amount of $86,898.71 was entered (R 477-478).
III.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Were the Munkhoffs negligent in their caretaking of Bo and did such
negligence proximately cause Mr. Kummerling's injuries?
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IV.

ARGUMENT

A. The trial court correctly denied the Munkhoff's Motion for
Summary Judgment regarding Kummerling's negligence
claim because the Kummerlings raised genuine issues of fact
as to Munkhoff's duty and proximate cause.
There were a number of factual disputes at the time of summary
judgment including the extent and nature of care and control that the
Munkhoffs exercised over the dog Bo. Also, disputes of facts arose at the
time of summary judgment as to the Munhoffs knowledge of the vicious
propensities of Bo. Finally, there were genuine issues of material fact
regarding Munkhoff's compliance with Coeur d'Alene City Ordinances in
order to protect the public, which required appropriate signage, fencing and
muzzling of Bo. The Munkhoffs throughout have dismissed any
responsibility for the acts of Bo, despite evidence which demonstrated that
Bo continually resided in their home from November 2012 to July 30, 2013
when the attack occurred. Evidence about the time of Summary Judgment
also demonstrated the Munkhoffs were aware of the requirements of housing
a dangerous, aggressive dog and agreed to adhere to those requirements, i.e.
muzzling, signage ect ... but failed to do so. Certainly no injury to Mr.
Kummerling would ever have occurred had the Munkhoffs followed their
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duty imposed, not only by ordinance, but my common law to protect the
innocent third parties from attacks by a dog with known vicious propensities
1. Standard of Review on Motion for Summary Judgment
I.R.C.P. 56(c) provide that "The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
The Munhoffs have the burden of proof to show that there is no genuine
issue of material fact with regard to the Kurnmerling's claim Chandler v.
Hayden, 147 Idaho 765 (2009). The Appellate Court standard of review of a
denial of Summary Judgment is the same as the Trial Court Thomson v.
Idaho Insurance Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530 887 P.2d 1034, 1037
( 1994). All facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the nonmoving party
and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts are to be in
favor of the non-moving party Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541 808
P.2d 876, 878 (1991). The material issues of fact in this case involved the
Munkhoffs allegations that they had no care, control, or involvement with
the dog, Bo, or knowledge of Bo's vicious propensities.
The trial court correctly determined that the evidence, when construed
in the light most favorable to the Kummerlings, presented genuine issues of
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material fact and/or demonstrated that the Munkhoffs were not entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 228
159 P.3d 862, 865 (2007). One of the major issues in this case was the
credibility of the witnesses. Where there is a conflict in evidence; a
determination should not be made on summary judgment if the credibility
can be tested by testimony in a court of trial before the trier of fact. Argyle v.
Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668 691 P.2 1283 (Ct. App. 1984). The issues of
credibility in this case were very important as can be seen by the Trial
Court's Memorandum denying a new trial in this matter (R 44 7 -449). There
were genuine issues of material fact as to when, where, what times and
under what conditions Bo was kept at the Munkhoff home and the extent of
the Munkhoffs caregiving duties.
2. The Munkhoffs breach their duty to Mr. Kummerling because not
only were they custodians of Bo; they were care keeper and
harborers of Bo.
There is no distinction between custodian and owner of an aggressive
or dangerous dog pursuant to Coeur d'Alene City Ordinances 6.20.030 and
6.20.040 (R 82-89). These ordinances specifically mention not only the
owner but also the custodian of the dog are responsible for harboring an
aggressive or dangerous animal and are bound by the requirements of
appropriate signage, fencing and muzzling of the aggressive/ dangerous dog.
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The Munkhoffs agreed to keep the dog at their home and abide by the
City of Coeur d' Alene's Ordinances regarding aggressive, dangerous dogs.
The Munkhoffs knew the dog was aggressive/ dangerous. The dog
predominantly resided at the Munkhoffs. They were aware or should have
been aware of the fact that Bo was declared aggressive on November 27,
2012, when found running loose near their home in February, 2013, bit
another person on April 9, 2017 and still kept the dog at their home without
proper signage or muzzling. They assumed the duty and responsibility by
taking all these actions.
a. The Munkhoffs had complete care, custody and control
of the dog, Bo and despite that custody failed to take
reasonable steps to protect Mr. Kummerling
Both under Idaho law, common law and statute, custodians have a
duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury if they are aware of the
dangerous propensities of the dog Braese v. Stinker Stores, Inc. 157 Idaho
443, 337 P.3d 602 (2014). Coeur d'Alene City Ordinance 6.20.030 and
Coeur d'Alene City Ordinance 6.20.040, I.C. § 25-2805(2). The Munkhoffs
were custodians of Bo in that they housed, fed, and cared for him while he
resided at their premises from November, 2012 through July 30, 2013.
Those actions to the ordinary person would make them appear to be the
owner as well.
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While there are no definitions of custodian either under the Coeur d'
Alene City Ordinance or Idaho Statute pertinent to animals; the dictionary
definition of custodian is "One who has care of something as of the exhibits
in a museum, a caretaker or keeper''. The definition of custody is "a keeping
safe or guarding; care; protection; guardianship" Webster's New Universal
Abridged Dictionary 2nd Edition (1983). The definitions clearly fit the

relationship that the Munkhoffs had with the Bo. Sam himself acknowledged
that the Munkhoffs would be better custodians of Bo and that he should be
kept at their house (R 69

,r B).

The Munkhoff's argue that the mere walking of a dangerous dog is
sufficient to terminate any legal responsibilities the custodians and
caregivers of that dog might have. The Munkhoffs cite McClain v. Lewiston
Interstate Fair and Racing Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015, (1909) for the
proposition that a family member taking a dog out in public relieves the
owner and/ or custodian for harm the dog causes while in public. In McClain
the court determined that if a person was an owner or caretaker in control of
such animal was a question of fact to be determined by the jury McClain at
1027. The Munkhoffs have cited Georgia, Illinois and Wisconsin cases for the
proposition that a person who keeps a dog and allows a third party to take
control of it is not responsible for the damage the dog might cause. This is
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not the law of Idaho nor are these Idaho cases. More importantly all five of
these cases are inapplicable to the preset case, as the dogs involved were not
previously adjudged aggressive or dangerous nor did any of the
custodians/owners assume a duty under statute or ordinance to take steps
to protect the dog from injuring persons. Steps such as muzzling and
signage is the case in this appeal. There is no evidence that the
owners/custodians the dogs mentioned in those out-of-state cases were
required to fence, muzzle and provide adequate signage to inform the public
and protect the public as is the case here.
b. The Munkhoffs had a duty because they specifically
undertook the responsibility to house Bo consistent
with Coeur d'Alene City Ordinances
This case does not involve a set of facts where Bo was visiting the
Munkhoffs and Sam decided to take Bo for a walk resulting in the injury. Bo
resided at the Munhoffs. He was cared for by the Munkhoffs. The Munkhoffs
assumed this responsibility or undertaking by acknowledging the
requirements of the city ordinances regarding fencing, muzzling and signage
and affirmatively indicated that they would comply with those requirements.
A Prima Facia case of negligence requires that a plaintiff must establish "1).
A duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain
standard of conduct; 2). A breach of that duty; 3). A casual connection
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between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and 4). Actual
loss or damage" Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247, 985 P.2d 669, 672
( 1999). In Braese, the court indicated "A store owner would also have a duty
to protect patrons from a dog that the store owner knew or should have
known of the animals vicious or dangerous propensities Braese at 446. The
Munkhoffs were well aware of the dangerous propensities of the dog. Or at
least a question of fact arose as to those dangerous propensities. A person
who keeps, harbors or otherwise has custody of a dog is required to exercise
proper judgment in the control of that dog. See McClain supra. The
Munkhoffs once they assumed the duty of harboring the dog are responsible
for any foreseeable damage that can be caused by the aggressive, dangerous
dog, in this case, Bo. The Munkhoffs breached that duty by failing to have
proper signage informing the public including Mr. Kummerling of the
dangerousness of the dog and/ or allowing the dog to be in public without a
muzzle.
The casual connection, which is a third requirement of negligence for
summary judgment purposes was met in that had the dog been muzzled or
had adequate precautions been made regarding the signage or simply had
the Munkhoffs refused to house the dog, Mr. Kummerling would not have

Page 16

been injured. The fourth element, which is the actual loss or damage is
evident by the injuries suffered by Mr. Kummerling to his face.
c. All the arguments raised in Munkhoffs appeal of the
summary judgment involve questions of fact, which
were disputed at the time of the hearing.
The Munkhoffs have argued that they have no duty to protect Mr.
Kummerling from Bo. These duties arrive in large part and are determined
by what Kummerling knew as well as the Munkhoffs regarding the
dangerous propensities of Bo. The factual circumstances surrounding that
case are relevant for determining that duty i.e. what each person knew and
what steps did he take. Those were factual issues which were disputed at the
time of the summary judgment hearing. The factual issues of custody,
compliance with the Coeur d'Alene City Ordinance regarding signage and
muzzling as well as whether the Munkhoffs affirmatively undertook the duty
to care for the dog are all questions of fact and not subject to dismissal at
summary judgment. The issue of negligence itself is more appropriate for a
jury to determine than to be decided at summary judgment. "It is for the jury
to decide what a reasonably careful person would do under circumstances
shown by the evidence." Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 890 749 P.2d
1012, 1015 (1988).
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The Munkhoffs cite Stoddart v. Pocatello School District No. 25, 149
Idaho 679, 239 P.3d 784 (2010) for the premise that injuries which occur by
an instrumentality off the defendant's property relieves him of liability.
However, in Stoddart the issue was one of foreseeability in that it was not
foreseeable that a child would be murdered. Also, contrary to the case at
hand, in Stoddart there were no specific statutory provisions that the school
had violated. In this case there were specific restrictions as a condition of
keeping the dog, which the Munkhoffs ignored. Consequently a question of
fact regarding negligence remained after summary judgment, which was for
the jury to resolve.
d. It was foreseeable that damage would result to third
parties if the Munkhoffs continued to harbor Bo
without taking precautions to protect the public
Boswell v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554 348, P.2d 497 (Ct. App. 2015) stands
for the proposition that in a dog bite case, especially involving an animal that
had previous incidents, dismissal of a negligence claim at summary
judgment is inappropriate. The issue of whether a duty occurs in large part
is based upon whether the harm was foreseeable Turpen v. Granieri, supra.
Foreseeability is a question of fact, which precludes entry of a summary
judgment. Lundy v. Hazen, 90 Idaho 323, 411 P.2d 768 (1966). Whether
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liability attaches and a duty exists is in large part foreseeability of the injury
depends on the degree of harm and the effort to prevent it. Where the degree
of the result of harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively low
degree of foreseeability is required Turpen 133 Idaho at 248. Foreseeability
also relates to the size of the harm rather than the specific mechanism of the
injury Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300, 796 P.2d 506 (1990).
The issue at summary judgment is whether sufficient facts disputed or not
exist take to the jury. It is within the province of the jury to determine
whether the harboring of Bo would lead to injury to innocent persons.
The Munkhoffs acknowledge in page 23 of their Brief that it was
foreseeable that Sam would walk Bo while he was visiting the Munkhoffs. It
is also foreseeable that if the dog was allowed to walk without a muzzle and
was approached by someone in a nonthreatening manner, that person could
be attacked.
3. The Munkhoffs harboring of Bo and failure to abide by signage and
muzzling requirements was a proximate cause of Mr. Kummerling's
m1unes.
The Munkhoffs argue that there is no proximate cause link between
any duty the Munkhoffs may have had of reasonable care that resulted in
injuries to Mr. Kummerling. Proximate cause is a question of fact. Cramer v.
Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 875, 204 P.3d 508, 515 (2009). There can be more

Page 19

than one proximate cause of the injury complained of, which can result in
liability to the defendant. Unrelated tortious acts of different defendants can
occur as proximate causes of an injury Lindhartsen v. Myler, 91 Idaho 269,
272, 420 P.2d 259, 262(1966).
There were sufficient facts before the court to survive summary
judgment regarding proximate cause. True proximate cause focuses on
whether legal policy supports responsibility being "extended to the
consequences of conduct... (it) determines whether liability for that
conduct attaches." Henderson v. Comico, Inc., 95 Idaho 690, 695, 518 P.2d
873, 878 (1973). If the Munkhoffs actions in harboring the dog, failure to
muzzle and failing to provide adequate signage was reasonably foreseeable
as a natural probable consequence of the defendant's conduct, then liability
attaches. Doe 1 v. Sisters of the Holy Cross, 126 Idaho 1036, 895 P.2d
1229, Ct. App. (1995).
a. The failure of signage is a breach of the ordinance and constitutes a
genuine issue of fact.
Whether the signage caused, in part, the damage to Mr. Kummerling is a
question of fact. If the Munkhoffs violated any of the City of Coeur d' Alene's
Ordinances, which is undisputed they did, such violation constitutes
negligence Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 617, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242

Page 20

(1986). Establishing negligence per se through violation of statute is to
conclusively establish the first two elements of a cause of action in
negligence, (duty and breach) Slade v. Smith's Management Corp., 119 Idaho
482, 489, 808 P.2d 401, 408 (1991).
b. The walking of Bo by Sam did not constitute the superseding cause,
which would relieve the Munkhoffs from liability.
A superseding cause is an act of a third person or force, which by its
intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another, which
is antecedent negligence is substantial fact of bringing about Lundy v.
Hazen, 90 Idaho 323,329 411 P.2d 768,771 (1966). Sam's actions in
walking the dog were not a superseding cause because it was reasonably
foreseeable.
The Restatement Second of Torts Section 42 ( 1965) provides the
following guidelines to determine whether an act is a superseding cause: (a)
The fact that the intervention brings about harm different in kind from
which would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence; (b) The fact
that its operation of or the consequences thereof appear after the event to be
extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing at
the time of its operation; (c) The fact that the intervening force is operating
independently of any situation created by the actor's negligence, or, on the
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other hand is or is not a normal relief result of such situation; (d) The fact
that the operation of the intervening force is due to a third person's act or
his failure to act; (e) The fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a
third person, which is wrongful towards the other and as such subjects the
third person to liability to him; (f) The degree of culpability of a wrongful act
of a third person, which sets the intervening force in motion. The Plaintiffs
did argue at the time of hearing that if Defendants had posted warning signs,
Mr. Kummerling would not have tried to pet the dog. Also, if Bo had been
muzzled, the injury would not have occurred. Applying the above referenced
factors of the restatement, it is clear that Sam's walking Bo was not a
superseding factor to eliminate responsibility of the Munkhoffs.
It is clearly foreseeable that the dog whether by Sam, or otherwise,
would be walked. Mr. Kummerling would not have attempted to pet Bo if he
aware that dangerous dog signs had been posted on the Munkhoff's property
(R 100). The requirements of foreseeability have been met by the
Kummerlings. l)The Munkhoffs were aware of the dog's
aggressive/ dangerous propensities; 2) The Munkhoffs were aware of steps
that were necessary to address the aggressive/ dangerous propensities of the
dog and keep the dog on their premises but failed to do so; 3) It was
foreseeable that if the Munkhoffs did not address those issues regarding
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muzzling, harboring an aggressive dangerous dog and/ or fencing, the dog
could in fact harm someone; and 4) It was foreseeable that Sam would take
the dog for a walk and the dog could possibly bite someone during that walk
if not muzzled.
Acts of negligence whether joint or independent of each other can both
cause the proximate cause of an injury Valles v. Union Pacific Railroad, Co.,
72 Idaho 231, 238-239, 238 P.2d 1154, 1161-1162 (1951). Before an
intervening superseding cause of an accident can become the sole proximate
cause of the injury and thus relieve the first negligent wrong doer of liability,
such subsequent cause must have been unforeseen, unanticipated and not a
probable consequence of the original negligence. Lundy v. Hazen at 330
citing Dewey v. Keller, 86 Idaho 506, 388 P.2d 988 (1964). The Munkhoffs
argue that the lack of signage and/ or muzzling was not a direct or actual
cause of Mr. Kummerling's injuries. Actual cause is whether a particular
event produced a particular consequence Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho
284, 288, 127 P.3d 187, 191 (2005). The issues with the signage is simply
answered by the fact that Mr. Kummerling would not have attempted to pet
the dog or come near it if he was aware that the dog had been declared
dangerous and had been notified by adequate signage on the Munkhoff
home. In regards to the muzzling, if Mr. Kummerling had seen the muzzle on
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the dog, first of all that would have put him on notice that there was some
dangerous propensities with the dog and secondly, the dog would not have
been able to attack him.

B. The trial court's denial of the Munkhoff's motion for a new trial
and remittitur were appropriate
The Munkhoffs filed a motion for new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P.
59(a)(l)(A), (F), (G), 60(b)(3) and I.C. § 6-807. (R 410-418) A motion for
remitter under I.R.C.P. 59.1 also was filed by the Munkhoffs. (R 410-418)
The Munkhoffs requested, in their Appellate Brief, relief pursuant to I.R.C.P
60(b)(6). No such request was made at the motion for new trial and therefore
relief under that provision on the appellate level is inappropriate. (R 410418)
The basis for the I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l)(A) and 60(b)(3) motions for new trial
by the Munkhoffs was an unsubstantiated claim that Mr. Kummerling
misrepresented to the court and jury at the time of trial, the extent of his
hearing problems (R 412 ,i A and R 416-417 R 407-409). Mr. Kummerling
used a hearing aided device provided by the court during the trial. (R420 ,i 4)
Uncontroverted declarations and or affidavits of Mr. Kummerling (R 419420), Baerbel Litke (R 422-423) and Kummerlings' attorney Larry J. Kuznetz
(R 425-427) confirmed that Mr. Kummerling's hearing loss was substantial,
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very real, and occurred after the dog attack and prior to trial. Consequently
the Munkhoffs, for appellate purposes have failed to preserve and or present
a claim for new trial under I.R.C.P. 60.
1. Standard of Review
The standard applicable to the trial court's decision to grant or deny a
new trial under I.C.R.P. 59(a) is an abuse of discretion standard. Burggraf v.
Chaffin, 121 Idaho 171,173 823 P.2d 775 (1991). That abuse of discretion
must be manifest Pratton v Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 850, 840 P.2d 392,
394( 1992). The reason for this standard is that the trial court is best capable
to weigh the demeanor, credibility, and testimony of the witnesses and
evidence overall. Quick v Crane 111 Idaho 759, 770, 727 P.2d 1187, 1198
(1986). To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, the
appellate court is to consider whether it correctly perceived the issue as
discretion, whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and
consistent with legal standards, and whether it reached its decision by an
exercise of reason Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 56, 44 P.3d 1108, 1111
(2002).
2. The jury award was appropriate and not excessive.
The Munkhoffs have abandoned their appeal of the trial court's ruling
denying their request for a new trial based upon irregularity by an adverse
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party under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l)(A) and fraud or misrepresentation pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(3). That leaves their appeal for a new trial claims based upon
I.C. § 6-807 and I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l)(F) regarding excessive damages and I.R.C.P.
59(a)(l)(G) regarding insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict.
As a general rule it is the jury's function to set the damage award
based upon its sense of fairness and justice Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759,
769,727 P.2d 1187, 1197 (1986). A verdict should only be overturned by a
trial judge in very limited cases. Hei v. Holzer, 145 Idaho 563, 181P.3d. 489,
(2008). Respondents have not found any Idaho case affirming the trial
court's discretion to overrule jury verdict in favor of a Plaintiff. For this court
at this juncture to overrule the jury's decision would be a manifest abuse of
discretion and invade the province of a jury.
The power of the court over excessive damages exists only when the
facts are such that excess appears as a matter of law or such as to suggest,
at first blush passion prejudice, or corruption on the part of the jury Blaine
v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 671, 429 P.2d 397, 403 (1967). To overrule a jury
decision, an award must shock the conscience of the trial judge and lead the
trial judge to conclude it would be unconscionable to let the damage award
by the jury stand. Dinneen v. Finch, 100 ID 620, 625, 603 P.2d 575, 580
(1979). The jury award in this case did not shock the conscience of the trial
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judge. The trial judge in a lengthy memorandum decision outlined in detail
the reasons for the denial of the Munkhoffs motion for new trial. (R 436455). In that decision the trial court stated the disparity between the jury's
allocation and the court's allocation certainly does not shock the conscience
of the court but instead convinces the court of the reasonableness of the
jury's allocation and that it was not based upon passion or prejudice (R 452453). The fact the amount the jury awarded and what the trial judge would
have awarded is evidence itself of lack of passion or prejudice. In regard to
the allocation of fault; the Trial Court stated, "With respect to the jury's
allocation of fault, the Court has considered how it would have allocated
fault based upon the evidence and it finds that the jury's allocation and the
Court's allocation are very close" (R 452-453).
The Munkhoffs have argued in their appeal that the trial court
inappropriately applied the two-pronged test stated in Robertson v. Richards,
115 Idaho 628, 769 P.2d 505 (1989) citing Blaine v Byers 91 Idaho 665, 429
P.2d 397 (1967). In the present case, the trial court, after weighing all the
evidence and determining the credibility of the witnesses, determined that
the jury award was reasonable. The trial court took pains to address the
credibility of the witnesses in its' memorandum decision denying the
Munkhoffs' motion for new trial. The trial court found the plaintiffs', Mr.
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Kummerling and Ms. Litke, to be credible. (R 44 7). The trial court found Sam
Munkhoff to lack credibility. (R 44 7-448) "The Court also found Mark
Munkhoff, and, to a lesser extent, Robyn Munkhoff, to lack credibility''. (R
448) The trial court did satisfy the second prong of the test cited in Blaine
and Robertson directing the court to consider whether probably a different
result would occur in retrial. The trial court did consider this prong and
basically stated it was in agreement with both the jury award and allocation
of fault negating the probability of a different result at a new triaL
3. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict and the
denial of the motion for a new trial was appropriate.
The Munkhoffs state that there is no evidence showing the Munkhoffs
were custodians of Bo at the time of attack. The following evidence
demonstrates that the Munkhoffs had care, control and custody of Bo at the
time of attack:
a. Sam acknowledged on November, 27 2012, when he met Officer Laurie
Deus at the Munkhoffs home, that Bo would be housed there. (Tr. Vol.
II, p. 207 11 2-6).
b. Based upon discussions with Mark Munkhoff on November 27, 2012,
Officer Deus believed Bo would be housed at the Munkhoff's home.(Tr.
Vol. II, p. 208 11. 6-25)
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c. Officer Deus indicated on the declaration of aggressive dog citation
regarding the November, 2012 incident with Bo that the address where
the dog would be housed was the Munkhoffs home at 3810 Sutters
Way. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 21111. 1-11)
d. Mark Munkhoff indicated to Officer Deus on November 27, 2012 that
Bo would be staying at his home. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 214, 11. 12-22. Mark
Munkhoff also stated he would contain the dog and the dog was part
of the family, (R 71-72

1 E)

e. Officer Deus reviewed the require men ts for keeping an aggressive dog
including fencing, signage and muzzling with both Sam and Mark
Munkhoff on November 27, 2012 and Mark Munhoff verbally agreed to
those conditions. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 215 11. 2-9)
f.

The dog, Bo, was residing at the Munkhoff's home on April 30, 2013
when he attacked another person.(Tr. Vol. II, page 219 11. 24-25 and
page 220 11. 1-2)

g. Officer Deus testified that once a dog has been declared aggressive or
dangerous; the owner or custodian must notify the City of Coeur d'
Alene where the dog is residing, including any changes in residence.
(Tr. Vol. II, page 199 11. 14-20. No residence addresses for the location
of Bo were provided to Officer Deus other than the Munkhoffs home.
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h. Sam Munkhoff testified Bo and the Munkhoff's dog "Baxter" were
running loose on April 29, 2013, after escaping the Munkhoff's yard.
(Tr.Vol. II, page 236 11. 2-22. In this incident Bo bit a third party and
was cited as a dangerous dog. (Tr. Vol. II, page 235 11.
1.

Bo was also found running loose in Coeur d'Alene in February of 2013
but was not cited. (Tr.Vol. II, page 234 11. 16-24)

J.

Mark Munkhoff falsely indicated to Officer Deus on April 30, 2013 and
May 3, 2013, that Bo was not allowed on his premises but stated "if the
dog shows up, he will shoot it" (R 93) and (R 94

,r 4). He also indicated

on May 3, 201.3 that Sam was not allowed to move back in the
Munkhoff's home R 94

,r 4)

k. Robyn Munkhoff told Officer Deus immediately after the attack that
Sam had been working in North Dakota the last few months and Bo
had "been living in our backyard the whole time Sam had been in North
Dakota" (R 99

,r 5).

1. Bo had been residing at the Munkhoffs residence a number of months
prior to the attack according to Mr. Kummerling (R 112

,r 6).

m. Mark and Robyn Munkhoff had been the sole custodians of Bo while
Sam was in North Dakota (R 113

,r 7).
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n. The Munkhoffs admitted Bo was allowed to stay with them (R 64

,r

3).

and was staying with them at the time of the attack on July 30, 2013
(R 65

,r

5).

o. Sam lied to Officer Deus when he told her that he and Bo were residing
in the Long Beach, California, area sometime between November, 2012
and July 30, 2013. (Tr. Vol. II. Page 222 11. 22-25 and page 238 11.1-5)
p. According to Sam, he was working in North Dakota from July 5, 2013
through the end of August, 2013, while Bo was still residing at the
Munkhoff's home. (Tr. Vol. II. page 238 11. 17-25 and page 239 11. 1-12).
Contrary to this Robyn Munkhoff stated to Officer Deus that Sam had
been working in North Dakota the last few months prior to the attack
(R 112

,r

6)

q. Bo was a 65 pound pit bull who was solid muscle and Sam was
concerned it wasn't safe for his mother to walk the dog. (Tr. Vol. II.
Page 243 11. 7 -12)
r. Sam admitted he lied to protect Bo. (Tr. Vol. II. Page 243 11. 13-15)
s. Mark Munkhoff told Officer Deus that "he agreed to contain the dog in
my yard". (Tr. Vol. II, page 255 11. 23-25, and page 256 line 1.)
t. Mark Munkhoff testified that he was the primary caregiver for Bo in
July of 2013. (Tr. Vol. II, page 267 11. 3-7.)
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u. Robyn Munkhoff fed and watered Bo in July of 2013. (Tr. Vol. II, page
281 11 20-25.)
v. Robyn Munkhoff could not provide any addresses for where Sam and
Bo allegedly lived from November, 2012 thru July 30, 2013. (Tr. Vol. II,
page 279 11.18-25, and page 280 11. 1-4.)
w. Robyn Munkhoff told Mr. Kummerling that she was taking care of Bo
and suggested Mr. Kummerling spray the fence to stop Bo from
jumping on it. (Tr. Vol. I, page 70 11.213-25 and page 7111. 1-15.)
x. Mr. Kummerling did not see a beware of dog sign posted on the

Munkhoff's property prior to and up until the time he was attacked.
(Tr. Vol. I, page 72 11. 23-25, and page 73 11.1-7.)
y. Robyn Munkhoff indicated if her dog bit someone she would take
precautions that she needed to. Tr. Vol. III, page 372 11. 8-15.)

z. Officer Deus did not see a beware of a dog sign on the Munkhoff
property either in December 2012 or at the time of the attack on July
30, 2013 (R81

,r

3) (R99

,r

5).

aa. Sam told Officer Deus that it would be better if Bo stayed at the
Munkhoff's home (R 80

,r

3).

There is more than substantial evidence that the Munkhoffs were the
caretakers of Bo, and that Bo resided at the Munkhoff's home at the time of
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the attack on Mr. Kummerling. This combined with the lack of credibility of
all the defendants supports the jury verdict in this matter. A jury verdict
must be upheld if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value
that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of the
jury April Beguesse Inc. v Rammell, 156 Idaho 500, 509, 328 P.3d 480, 489
(2014). The jury's verdict on factual issues will generally not be disturbed on
appeal McKim v Horner, 143 Idaho 568, 572, 149 P3d 843, 847 (2006).
4. The Munkhoff's motion for a new trial filed with the trial court does
not raise an issue regarding the custodian of Bo.
The word custodian is never used in the Munkhoff's Motion for New
Trial (R 410-418). That issue is raised for the first time on appeal. The
Munkhoffs in their motion for new trial only indicated under I.C.R.P.
59(a)(l)(G) that there was insufficient evidence to find the Munkhoffs
responsible. They did not indicate that there was insufficient evidence to find
that the Munkhoffs were custodians or that Sam was not the sole custodian;
but just a vague reference to the fact that Robin Munkhoff should not have
the percentage ofliability attached to her (R 414-416). The Munkhoffs
admitted that the evidence justified placing some responsibility on Mark
Munkhoff (R 415-416). In the Munkhoffs' motion for new trial they did not
allege that it was improper for the jury to hold Mark Munkhoff responsible;
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they merely asserted the percentage of allocation of fault to him was
inappropriate (R 414-416).
There is no evidence that the jury was confused regarding the concept
of custodian and owner. Contrary to the assertion of the Munkhoffs under
City of Coeur d'Alene Ordinance, a custodian as well as the owner of an
aggressive, dangerous dog can be held responsible for the action of that dog
(R 83-88).
5. The trial court's denial of the Munkhoffs motion for remittitur and
pursuant to I.C. § 6-807 was appropriate.
Respondents herein reallege the same arguments for denial of the
motion for remittitur and pursuant to I.C. § 6-807 as contained in the
argument for new trial in paragraph IV, B, 3 above. Whether remittitur or
additur; The Supreme Court of Idaho has previously stated it will not
overrule the trial court concerning request for a new trial pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 59 where the trial court did not abuse its discretion and where the
trial court stated the reasons for its ruling with sufficient particularity.
Tuttle v Wayment Farms Inc. 131 Idaho 105, 107, 952 P2d 1241, 1243
(1998).
The trial court in its Amended Memorandum Decision and Order
Denying the Munkhoffs motion for New Trial and Remittitur specifically
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addressed the four criteria of I.C. § 6-807 and found that 1) the jury verdict
was supported by the evidence, including the fact the court would have come
to the same conclusion and allocate the liability similar to the jury verdict (R
449); 2) the damage to Mr. Kummerling was severe and commensurate with
the damages awarded, and did not shock the conscience of the court (R 449,
452); 3) there was no fact or legal error during the presentation of evidence
(R 451-452); and 4) the award was not a result of passion or prejudice (R
445-449) Hei v Holzer at page 568-569 and 494-495.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the Kummerlings request the court affirm
the decision of the trial court and deny the Munkhoffs request to overturn
the trial court's decision on Summary Judgment Motion and the Motion for
Remittitur of New Trial.
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